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Abstract—We address the polling problem in social networks
where individuals collaborate to choose the most favorite choice
amongst some options, without divulging their vote and publicly
exposing their potentially malicious actions. Given this social
interaction model, Guerraoui et al. [1], [2] recently proposed
polling protocols that do not rely on any central authority or
cryptography system, using a simple secret sharing scheme along
with verification procedures to accurately compute the poll’s
final result. However, these protocols can be deployed safely and
efficiently provided that, inter alia, the social graph structure
should be transformed into a ring structure-based overlay and
the number of participating users is perfect square. Consequently,
designing secure and efficient polling protocols regardless these
constraints remains a challenging issue.
In this paper, we present EPol, a simple decentralized polling
protocol that relies on the current state of social graphs. More
explicitly, we define one family of social graphs that satisfy what
we call the m-broadcasting property (where m is less than or
equal to the minimum node degree) and show their structures
enable low communication cost and constitute necessary and
sufficient condition to ensure vote privacy and limit the impact of
dishonest users on the accuracy of the polling output. In a social
network of N users with diameter ∆G and D ≤ (m − 1)∆G/2
dishonest ones (and similarly to the works [1], [2] where they
considered D <
√
N ), a privacy parameter k enables us to obtain
the following results: (i) the maximum probability that an honest
node’s vote is disclosed with certainty is (D/N)k+1 and without
certainty is
(
D
N
/(1−2D
N
)
)[
1−∑k
i=0
γi(2
D
N
)2i+1
]
where γi is the
proportion of nodes voting for 2i+ 1 shares and 0 ≤ i ≤ k; (ii)
up to 2D votes can be revealed with certainty; (iii) the maximum
impact on the final result is (6k + 4)D, and the average impact
is
[(∑
k
i=0
γi(2i + 1)
)(
1 + 2
∑
k
i=0
γi
i+α
2i+1
)
+ 1
]
D, where α is
the proportion of users correctly voting; (iv) unlike [1], [2], our
protocol is effective to compute more precisely the final result.
Furthermore, despite the use of richer social graph structures,
the communication and spatial complexities of EPol are close to
be linear.
Keywords—Social networks, Polling protocol, Secret sharing,
Privacy.
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, within billions of users, online social
networks (OSNs) and social applications have changed the
way users interact with the Internet. People can discuss,
exchange photos and personal news, find others of a common
interest, and many more. Polling is one of the current practical,
useful but important topics in OSNs. In general, that is the
problem of providing to all participants the outcome of a poll
conducted among themselves, thus giving the most favorite
choice among some options. Each participant can express
his/her preference by submitting a vote, then all votes are
aggregated and the majority option will be chosen as the final
∗Funded by ANR Streams project.
result. Just to demonstrate one typical example, a university
has just launched a new administrative procedure and may ask
students whether or not this method is helpful, and each user
will choose one option between “Yes” and “No”. For the sake
of simplicity, we here consider such a polling problem with
only two options “+1” and “−1” for the concerning question.
The goal in studying this problem is to devise a polling
protocol such that it can perform a secure and accurate process
to sum up the initial votes with the presence of dishonest
users, who try to bias the outcome and disclose the votes
of honest ones. Despite the simplicity characteristics of this
problem, it takes an important part in incorporating user’s
opinion online. Thus, currently, several studies and solutions
for this problem using two settings, centralized and distributed
networks, are proposed. In the centralized OSN, for instance
Facebook Poll1 and Doodle2, such a computation process may
be easily achieved through a central server which is used to
collect the users’ votes before summing up them to obtain the
output. Nevertheless, this solution suffers from server failures
and particularly privacy problems: user might generally not
want his/her vote to be known by a central entity, and it is not
guaranteed the server will not bias and disclose the user votes.
In this paper, we focus on the polling protocol based on the
decentralized OSN where information is not concentrated in a
central point and hence, user privacy is improved. In addition,
we do not want to rely on cryptography for ensuring privacy
or accuracy because: (i) the cryptography uses complicated
computation that impacts to the scalability and practicality
of the protocols; (ii) all cryptography techniques rely on the
assumptions which are not proved and might be broken (e.g.,
the difficulty for factorizing the product of two big prime
numbers or solving the discrete logarithm problem); and (iii)
some traditional distributed computing problems can be solved
without cryptography as motivated in [7], [8].
Guerraoui et al. [1], [2] have opened the way to a novel
and promising approach to perform secure distributed polling
by proposing DPol, a simple distributed polling protocol based
on secret sharing scheme and without using cryptography. The
authors also presented the verification procedures to dissuade
user misbehaviors, and enable honest users to tag profiles of
dishonest ones. The probability of dishonest users violating
privacy is balanced by their impact on the accuracy of the
final result. However, DPol has practically some disadvantages.
Firstly, DPol relies on a structured overlay, a cluster-ring-based
structure inspired from [9]. Although it is efficient in term of
communication cost, it is on top and really apart from the
normal social graph. It does not take into account the social
links among users in the sense it builds the uniform distribution
1http://apps.facebook.com/opinionpolls/
2http://www.doodle.com/
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Algorithm Graph Max. Impact Privacy Nb. of Dishonest Nodes Complexity Crash
Spatial Message
DPol [1] Overlay (6k + 2)D (D/N)k+1 D <
√
N O(rk + |gi|) O(rk + |gi|) Yes
DPol* [2] Overlay (6k + 4)D (D/N)k+1 D <
√
N O(rk + |gi|) O(rk + |gi|) Yes
Pol [3] General (6k + 4)D (D/N)k+1 D < N/5 O(N2) O(k +N2) No
MPOL* [4] Overlay (6k + 2)D (D/N)k+1 D <
√
N O(rk2|gi|) O(rk + |gi|) No
PDP [5] Overlay 2(k +N)D (D/N)k+1 D ≥ k + 1 O(rk + |gi|) O(rk + |gi|) No
DiPA [6] Overlay 2(k +N)D (D/N)k+1 D ≥ k + 1 O(rk + |gi|) O(rk + |gi|) No
This work General (6k + 4)D (D/N)k+1 D ≤ (m − 1)∆G/2 O(k +mN) O(k +N.(d0 −m)) Yes
TABLE I: Comparison of distributed polling protocols where “Max. Impact”: the maximum difference between the output and the expected
result, “Privacy”: the probability a node’s vote is revealed, “Nb. of Dishonest Nodes”: the number of dishonest nodes the system can tolerate,
“Spatial complexity”: the total space a node must hold, “Message complexity”: the number of messages sent by a node, r: number of groups,
|gi|: group size, d0: maximum node degree, ∆G: network diameter. Entries marked with an asterisk (*) show the results for binary polling.
of users into groups. This is not practical as we have to
target a special case using notion of group instead of reserving
the normal structure of the graph. Secondly, the number of
users should be a perfect square number such that one social
graph with N users is divided into
√
N groups of size
√
N .
Thirdly, DPol assumes that dishonest nodes cannot wrongfully
blame honest ones which seems to be a too strong assumption.
This assumption helps honest nodes to correctly identify the
dishonest misbehaviors. Finally, transforming a graph into an
overlay is not always useful since that may affect some security
properties like accuracy and complexity. For instance, if the
network is a clique, then each node can easily obtain all data
from all its friends because they are fully connected. However
after transforming a clique into an overlay, as the data sent by
a node may be corrupted by the intermediate nodes, to ensure
the accuracy, DPol should do a verification procedure which of
course increases the communication cost. In addition, as stated
in DPol, an honest node may decide on the arbitrary data sent
by dishonest ones, and thus, it might be incorrect. It implies
the impact of dishonest nodes on accuracy may be high.
Later, several protocols and extensions inspired from the
idea of DPol have been proposed such as MPOL [4], PDP [5]
and DiPA [6]. However these protocols rely on the same ring-
based overlay structure, and have minor contribution compared
to DPol. Unlike these works, authors of [3] introduced a
distributed polling protocol and a family of more general social
graphs which ensures the correctness of the protocol and vote
privacy of nodes. Nonetheless, the communication model is
synchronous and the communication cost is super-linear in N ,
and is O(N2) in the worst case, with the presence of dishonest
nodes. It should be noted, as opposed to [3], all other works
based on an overlay structure considered complexities with
only honest nodes.
Accordingly, devising efficient and decentralized polling
protocols without cryptography and constraints (such as the
use of overlay structure and perfect square number of users)
imposed in [1], [2] remains a challenging problem.
Contributions. In this paper, we propose the design of a
simple decentralized polling protocol not requiring any central
authority or cryptography system. Unlike [1], [2], our protocol
is deployed on the original social network in such a way
each individual can perform the voting process privately and
securely without resorting to the group division. We describe
properties required for the social graph to ensure the correct-
ness of our protocol. Despite the use of richer social graph
structures (they also include the ring-based structure given
in [1], [2]), one node can receive/send so many duplicated
messages from/to other nodes. This can lead to flooding the
local storage and getting high communication cost. Inspired
from [10], we introduce a method for efficiently broadcasting
messages by using the concept that we call the m-broadcasting
property. A graph satisfies the m-broadcasting property for a
parameter m ∈ N such that 1 ≤ m ≤ dmin, where dmin
is the minimum node degree, if for each source node, there
exists a topological ordering of the nodes such that every node
either connects directly to the source or to some m nodes
preceding it in the ordering w.r.t. the source. Consequently,
instead of accepting all messages originating from a source, a
node stores only m ones passed by ordered paths. Appendix
A presents some examples of social graphs satisfying the m-
broadcasting property. The construction of a graph satisfying
the m-broadcasting property from a general graph is beyond
the scope of this paper. However, to be more practice, we
describe an algorithm to construct this kind of graphs in
Appendix B.
To describe carefully the distributed implementation of
a polling problem, we consider the following fundamental
criteria: accuracy, privacy, resilience to dishonest nodes, and
asymptotic complexity. Using the same notion of privacy
parameter k in [1], [2], we get the following results in a
system of size N with D dishonest users: (i) the probability
that an honest node’s vote is disclosed with certainty is at most
(D/N)k+1; (ii) up to 2D votes can be revealed with certainty
by the dishonest coalition; (iii) in practice, dishonest nodes
may also try to reveal a node’s vote even if they only get some
partial information of the vote (e.g., some shares of that vote).
We consider the case where dishonest nodes agree on some
uncertain vote disclosure rules (section IV-B), the maximum
probability of greedy (i.e., analyzing some shares of the vote)
and non-greedy (i.e., analyzing all shares of the vote) vote
detection are respectively
∑k
i=ρ γi
N+1
N−D+ρ+2 (
D
N−D+ρ+1 )
ρ+1
and
(
D
N /(1 − 2DN )
)[
1−∑ki=0 γi(2DN )2i+1] where γi is the
proportion of nodes voting with 2i + 1 shares and 0 ≤ ρ ≤
i ≤ k; (iv) the maximum impact from the dishonest coalition
to the final result is (6k + 4)D, and the average impact is[[∑k
i=0 γi(2i+1)
][
1+2
∑k
i=0 γi
i+α
2i+1
]
+1
]
D, where α is the
proportion of users correctly voting; (v) the maximum number
of dishonest nodes that the system can tolerate is (m−1)∆G/2,
where ∆G is the network diameter; and (vi) the communication
and spatial complexities of our protocol are close to be linear.
We are aware that the data sent by a node may be corrupted
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by the intermediate dishonest nodes. Thus, an honest node may
receive distinct values of the same data. As opposed to DPol
[1], [2], we ensure each node can decide the most represented
value to obtain correct data of other ones.
In addition, most of the previous works assume the exis-
tence of reliable communication among nodes. However, nodes
communicate by UDP which may suffer message loss on the
communication channels or nodes’ crash. In this work, we
analyze the effect of these factors on accuracy and termination
of the protocol by determining the impact on the final outcome
and the probability of a node failing to decide and compute
the final result.
We illustrate the comparison of contributions between our
work and other distributed polling protocols in Table I. This
table shows that our protocol tolerates more dishonest nodes
and has better complexities than other ones. More particularly,
if the graph is a ring structured, compared to DPol [1], [2],
our protocol has the same message complexity, but tolerates
more dishonest nodes and computes more accurately the poll
outcome. It is also noted that DPol investigated the effect of
crash only, and not of message loss.
Outline. This paper is organized as follows. Section II de-
scribes our polling model, and introduces a family of social
graphs. Section III presents our polling protocol and Section
IV analyzes its correctness with and without the presence of
dishonest nodes. Section V discusses the impact of crash and
message loss on accuracy and termination of the protocol. We
review related work in Section VI and conclude the paper with
future research in Section VII.
II. SOCIAL NETWORK MODEL
This section defines the user behaviors and presents the
social graph models. It should be noted that we consider the
same assumptions given in [1], [2].
A. User behaviors
The polling problem consists of a system modeled as the
form of an undirected social graph G = (V,E) with N = |V |
uniquely identified nodes representing users and E is a set of
social links. Each participant n expresses its opinion by giving
a vote vn ∈ {−1, 1}. After collecting the votes of all nodes,
the expected outcome is
∑
n vn. In this work, we consider the
following assumptions:
We consider the asynchronous model where each node can
communicate (send/receive messages) with its neighbors (e.g.,
direct friends). Some messages may arrive to the destination
with some delay. All nodes have to send/receive/forward
messages if they are requested.
Each node is either honest or dishonest. The honest node
completely complies with the protocol and takes care about its
privacy in the sense that the vote value is not disclosed. All
nodes care about their reputation: information related to a user
is intimately considered to reflect the associated real person.
In particular, dishonest nodes never do any misbehavior which
will jeopardize their reputation.
All dishonest nodes can form a coalition to get the full
knowledge of the network and try to do everything to achieve
these goals without being detected: (i) bias the result of the
n
x
y
z
a
b
c
producers Rn
consumers Sn
Fig. 1: Producers and consumers of n.
election by promoting their votes or changing the values they
received from other honest nodes; (ii) infer the opinions of
other nodes.
In order to unify the opinions and not give compensating
effects, all dishonest nodes make the single coalition D of size
D. However, they also want to protect their reputation from
being affected. They are selfish in the sense that each dishonest
node prefers to take care about its own reputation to covering
up each other [1], [2]. As such the dishonest nodes are rather
restricted but more reflective of the real human behavior than
Byzantine nodes [11].
To tolerate the existence of dishonest nodes with a limited
vote corruption, we assume each node has at least one honest
friend but it does not know which friend is honest or not.
To dissuade the user misbehaviors, an activity affected to
the profile of the concerned node is given. More precisely, if
node u is detected as dishonest one by v then u’s profile is
tagged with the statement “v accused u as a dishonest user”
and v’s profile has the statement “u is a bad guy”. Notice that
in social networks, no one would like to be tagged as dishonest.
Furthermore, we do not take into account the Sybil attacks
and spam since those kinds of misbehaviors can be detected
by some tools or several systems such as SybilGuard[12],
SybilLimit [13], and [14], [15] (for mitigating spam). However,
dishonest nodes can wrongfully blame other ones.
B. Social graph model
In this section, firstly, we define the terms and notations
of the social graph used throughout this work. Then we
describe the graphs with low communication cost. Finally, we
demonstrate the description of our family of graphs.
Notations. Each node n maintains a set of direct neighbors
Γ(n) of size dn, and two subsets of Γ(n): a set Sn of
consumers containing nodes that n sends messages to, and Rn
of producers relating to nodes for which n acts as a consumer.
They might not be disjoint, i.e., Sn ∩ Rn 6= ∅, as depicted
in Fig. 1 (where node z is a producer and is a consumer
as well). The procedure to define the set of producers and
consumers is as follows. Each node chooses an odd number
2i + 1 of neighbors as its consumers such that 0 ≤ i ≤ k
where k is a privacy parameter. It then establishes a three-way-
handshake protocol to inform its consumers that it is one of
their producers. By this way, it also obtains a set of producers.
We denote ∆G as the diameter of the network G. To our
best knowledge, the distributed algorithms for computing exact
diameter take time O(N) [16], [17].
Graphs with low communication cost. In the network,
consider the broadcasting operation initiated by a single node,
called source. The source has a data and wants to disseminate
it to all nodes in the network. In the naive approach, upon
receiving a message from a neighbor, a node stores the data
then forwards it on every other edge. Despite the use of richer
social graph structures, one node can receive/send so many
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duplicated messages (which may be passed by many paths)
from/to other nodes. This leads to flooding the local storage.
In this paper, inspired from [10], we propose a method for
efficiently broadcasting message by using the concept that
we call the m-broadcasting property. A graph satisfies the
m-broadcasting property for a positive integer m such that
1 ≤ m ≤ dmin, where dmin is the minimum node degree,
if for each source node, there exists a topological ordering of
the nodes in the graph such that every node either connects
directly to the source or to some m nodes preceding it in the
ordering w.r.t. the source. Accordingly, instead of accepting all
messages originating from a source, a node receives and stores
only m ones passed by ordered paths.
We denote by βn(s) a number of neighbors of n preceding
it in the ordering w.r.t. source s. (We sometimes omit the
mentioned source where no confusion arises.)
C. Secret sharing based graphs
In this part, we present the family of graphs without and
with the presence of dishonest nodes. We use a predefined
parameter k ∈ N (like [1], [2]) and a parameter m ∈ N to
present the features of our social graphs. Let G = (V,E) be
a social graph with the following properties:
Property 1 (Pg1 ). dn ≥ 2k + 1, |Sn| = 2i + 1 and |Rn| ≤
2k + 1 where 0 ≤ i ≤ k, for every n ∈ V .
Property 2 (Pg2 ). G satisfies the m-broadcasting property.
Property 3 (Pg3 ). For a source node, each other node has
less than m/2 dishonest neighbors preceding it in the ordering
(w.r.t. source node).
According to Property Pg1 , the set of consumers and the
set of producers of a node have the size of at most 2k+1 and
might not be disjoint. This condition distinguishes our graph
family from other structures in [4], [1], [2] and is more flexible
than a graph family in [3] since they all consider the restricted
condition where each node has exactly 2k + 1 consumers.
In addition, it also differs from [6], [5] which do not give
any condition to the upper bound of the number of producers
(that one node should have), thus, a dishonest node can send
arbitrary summing data to others and the accuracy of the global
outcome is easily affected. Property Pg2 enables us to reduce
the communication cost in the system. It is also noted that this
condition implicitly implies the condition that G is an honest
graph mentioned in [3], i.e., for every honest nodes u, v, there
exists a path between u and v containing only intermediate
honest nodes. Property Pg3 ensures each honest node always
obtains one correct version of data from other honest ones.
Property Pg3 also enables us to limit the size of dishonest
users, that is D ≤ m−12 ∆G (presented in Theorem 8).
From these properties, we characterize two families of graphs:
(i) G1 = {G | D(G) = ∅ and G satisfies Pg1 , Pg2}.
(ii) G2 = {G | D(G) 6= ∅ and G satisfies Pg1 , Pg2 and Pg3}.
Graphs in G1 contain only honest nodes and satisfy property
Pg1 and Pg2 . Graphs in G2 contain honest and dishonest nodes
and satisfy properties Pg1 , Pg2 and Pg3 .
III. POLLING PROTOCOL
In this section, we present our polling protocol, EPol, for
the network without crash and message loss. EPol is composed
of the following phases:
Sharing. In this phase, each node n contributes its opinion by
sending a set of shares expressing its vote vn ∈ {−1, 1} to its
consumers. We inspired the sharing scheme proposed in [18]
to generate shares. Namely, first n chooses randomly a value i
such that i ∈ {0, 1, ..., k}. This value i is not known by other
nodes. Then it generates 2i+1 shares Pn = {p1, p2, ..., p2i+1},
where pj ∈ {−1, 1} and 1 ≤ j ≤ 2i+1, including: i+1 shares
of value vn, and i shares of opposite vn’s value. The intuition
of this creation is to regenerate the vote vn when the shares are
summed. Later it randomly generates a permutation µn of Pn,
and sends shares to 2i+1 consumers. Lines 4–9 in Algorithm
1 describe this activity. Node also receives |Rn| shares from
its producers. Note that Sn and Rn might not be disjoint.3
After each node collects shares from its producers, and
sums into collected data cn (lines 10–15 in Algorithm 1), this
phase is over. It is also noted that because the votes and their
generating shares belong to the set {−1,+1}, nodes cannot
distinguish between a vote and a share. Hence, if a node opts
a value i = 0 and generates only 2i + 1 = 1 share, the
dishonest consumer receiving a message from that node could
not distinguish if such share was generated as a single one or
it is one among many generated shares of that node.
Figure 2 illustrates an example of the protocol for i =
k = 1. Figure 2a presents the network and the ordering of
nodes w.r.t. source A in the parentheses. Figure 2b depicts
the sharing phase at node A. Node A would like to vote +1,
thus, it generates a set of 2i + 1 = 3 shares {+1,−1,+1}.
Node A collects the shares from its producers and computes
the collected data cA = 3.
Broadcasting. In this phase, each node needs to disseminate
its collected data to all other nodes in such a way that each
other node eventually obtains that correct data. In the naive
approach, upon receiving a message from the neighbor, a
node stores the data then forwards it on every other edge.
Despite the use of richer social graph structures, and with the
presence of dishonest nodes which can corrupt data, one node
can receive/send so many duplicated messages (which may
be passed by many paths) from/to other nodes. This leads
to flooding the local storage. As motivated in Section II-C,
we propose a method for efficiently broadcasting messages by
using our concept of the m-broadcasting property. For a graph
satisfying the m-broadcasting property, each node n first sends
its collected data to all neighbors (lines 16–17). Then, upon
receipt of the message containing the collected data of source
s from neighbor r preceding it in the ordering (w.r.t. source
s), node n does one of the following activities:
• r = s: It decides on the data of source s by storing the
value cs in hn[s]. When the value hn[s] is assigned, it is
further forwarded to all dn − βn(s) nodes succeeding it
in the ordering (lines 21–24).
In Fig. 2c, node A broadcasts its data, then B receives,
stores that data in hB[A], and forwards it to F .
• r 6= s: To avoid the case that value hn[s] might be
calculated (and broadcast) twice for the direct neighbor
s, node n only considers the case r 6= s ∧ s /∈ Γ(n).
If this condition is satisfied, it adds the value cs to the
multiset Cn[s] of possible collected data for s (line 26).
3This distinguishes our protocol from approaches in [6], [5], [4], [1], [2].
The set of consumers and producers in these approaches are separated for
each of size 2k + 1.
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Algorithm 1: POLLING ALGORITHM AT NODE n ∈ {0, 1, ..., N − 1}
Input:
vn: A vote of node n, value in {−1, 1}
k : privacy parameter
m : positive integer where 1 ≤ m ≤ dmin
Variables:
cn: collected data, cn = 0
Cn: set of possible collected data
Cn[{0, 1, ...,N − 1} → ∅]
hn: set of final deciding collected data
hn[{0, 1, ...,N − 1} → ⊥]
Output: result
Polling Algorithm
1 Sharing(vn,Sn, i)
2 Broadcasting(cn)
3 Aggregating()
Procedure Sharing(vn,Sn, i)
4 Pn ← {vn}
5 for j ← 1 to i do
6 Pn ← Pn ∪ {vn} ∪ {−vn}
7 µn ←rand Pn
8 for j ← 0 to 2i do
9 send (SHARE, µn[j]) to Sn[j]
10 count← 0
11 while (count < |Rn|) do
12 upon event (receive (SHARE, p) from neighbor r in the first time) do
13 if (r ∈ Rn and p ∈ {−1, 1}) then
14 cn ← cn + p
15 count← count+ 1
Procedure Broadcasting(cn)
16 foreach (r ∈ Γ(n)) do
17 send (DATA, n, cn) to r
18 count← 0
19 while (count < N − 1) do
20 upon event (receive message (DATA, s, cs) from direct neighbor r preceding n
in the ordering w.r.t. source s) do
21 if (r = s) then
22 hn[s]← cs
23 count← count+ 1
24 Forward (DATA, s, cs) to other friends succeeding n in the ordering
w.r.t. source s
25 else if (s /∈ Γ(n)) then
26 Cn[s]← Cn[s] ∪ {cs}
27 if (|Cn[s]| = m) then
28 hn[s]← Decide(Cn[s])
29 count← count+ 1
30 send (DATA, s, hn[s]) to other dn − βn(s) friends succeeding
n in the ordering w.r.t. source s
Function Decide(Z)
31 return the most represented value in Z
Procedure Aggregating()
32 result ← 0
33 for s← 0 to N − 1 do
34 if (s 6= n) then
35 result ← result + hn[s]
36 else result ← result + cn
When node n has received the expected number m of
possible collected data for a given source s, it decides
on the collected data by choosing the most represented
value in Cn[s] and puts it in hn[s]. (Since the decision is
based on the most represented value, instead of waiting
for receiving all m forwarded data, node n can decide the
source’s data upon receipt of more than m/2 identical
data.) Node n then further forwards the data to all
dn − βn(s) nodes succeeding it (lines 27–30).
Fig. 2d depicts node F receives messages from its neigh-
bors about the data of source A. It has four friends, but
receives only m = 3 messages from preceding neighbors
E,B,D. As all values in CF [A] are 3, node F decides
that value as the collected data of A and stores it in hF [A].
It then forwards that data to its succeeding node M .
When a node decides the collected data of s and has no
succeeding friend, the value hn[s] is no longer forwarded. This
phase is complete if a node decides on the collected data of
all other ones in the network.
Aggregating. The final result is obtained at each node by
simply doing this computation: result = cn +
∑
j 6=n hn[j](lines 32–36).
IV. CORRECTNESS AND COMPLEXITY ANALYSIS
In this section, we present the correctness and complexity
analysis of our protocol when deployed on the graphs without
and with the presence of dishonest nodes.
A. Protocol and graph without dishonest nodes
We first analyze the correctness (including accuracy and
termination) of our protocol for the graphs of G1 in which
all participants are honest in Theorem 1. Then we analyze
the spatial and message complexities in Propositions 1 and 2
respectively.
Theorem 1 (Correctness). Consider a polling system of size N
with only honest nodes where each node n expresses a vote vn.
The polling algorithm is guaranteed to eventually terminate
and each node outputs
∑N−1
n=0 vn.
Proof (Accuracy): In the sharing phase, each node n
sends a set of shares Pn = {pn1 , pn2 , ..., pn2i+1} to its
consumers where
∑
pnj = (i + 1). vn + i. (−vn) = vn,
and also receives a set of shares {p′n1 , p′n2 , ..., p′nl} from its
producers (l = |Rn|) to obtain a collected data of value
cn =
∑l
j=1 p
′
nj . With the assumption there is no dishonest
node and without crash or message loss, each message from
the source successfully reaches the destination, and thus the
set of all sending shares of all nodes will be exactly coincided
with the set of all receiving shares of all nodes, namely:⋃
V {pn1 , pn2 , ..., pn2i+1} =
⋃
V {p′n1 , p′n2 , ..., p′nl}.
In the broadcasting phase, each node n broadcasts its
collected data to their neighbors, then they do honestly forward
that value to neighbors of neighbors of n (succeeding it
in the ordering w.r.t. source n) and so on. The messages
are finally received by all direct and indirect neighbors. It
infers an array hn contains all collected data of all nodes
in the system. Consequently, the final computation gives us
the value: result = cn +
∑
0≤j<N,j 6=n hn[j] =
∑N−1
j=0 cj =∑N−1
j=0
∑l
t=1 p
′
jt
=
∑N−1
j=0
∑2i+1
t=1 pjt =
∑N−1
j=0 vj .
Proof (Termination). In the sharing phase, each node has to
receive a finite number (|R|) of messages. In the broadcasting
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Fig. 2: Polling algorithm for i = k = 1 and m = 3.
phase, for a source s, each direct neighbor of s receives only
one message, and each other indirect neighbor receives m
messages. Since every node sends the required number of
messages and they are eventually arrived to destination, each
phase completes. As the protocol has a limited number of
phases, it is ensured to eventually terminate.
Proposition 1 (Spatial complexity). The total space each node
must hold is O(k +m.N).
Proof: Each node n maintains a set of producers and
consumers (at most 2(2k + 1)), a list of dn direct neighbors,
a set of N identities of nodes in the systems, a set of m
possible collected data for each of source s, a set hn to store
the deciding collected data. Therefore, the spatial complexity
is O(k) + O(dn) + O(N) + O(m.(N − 1)) + O(N − 1) =
O(k +m.N).
Proposition 2 (Message complexity). The number of messages
sent by a node n is O(k +N.(dn −m)).
Proof: In the sharing phase, node n sends at most 2k+1
messages. In the broadcasting phase, it sends dn messages
containing its collected data, and forwards at most dn − m
messages when receiving collected data of each source s from
its neighbors. Thus, the message complexity is O(k)+O(dn)+
O((N − 1).(dn −m)) = O(k +N.(dn −m)).
B. Protocol and graph with dishonest nodes
In this section, we study the impact of dishonest nodes on
privacy and accuracy when EPol is deployed on graphs of G2.
Privacy analysis
We denote by γi the proportion of nodes voting with 2i + 1
shares in the sharing phase, where 0 ≤ i ≤ k and ∑ki=0 γi = 1.
Assuming D ≤ (m− 1)∆G/2 (presented later in Theorem 8),
we consider two cases for disclosing a node’s vote as follows.
Vote disclosing with certainty. We discuss the case when the
vote of a given node may be disclosed with certainty in the
following theorem.
Theorem 2 (Certain Privacy). Assume a coalition of D dis-
honest nodes knows the number of shares sent by a node. The
probability Pce this coalition reveals correctly with certainty a
vote of the honest node voting with 2i+ 1 shares (0 ≤ i ≤ k)
is at most γi
(
D
N
)i+1
.
Proof: The coalition reveals correctly a node’s vote v if
and only if i + 1 consumers receiving i + 1 identical shares
of value v belong to the dishonest coalition. There are a
proportion γi of these nodes. Thus, that event occurs with
probability Pce = γi
(
D
i+1
)
/
(
N
i+1
) ≤ γi(DN )i+1.
Corollary 1. If all nodes send 2k + 1 shares in the sharing
phase, then the probability that a coalition of D dishonest
nodes reveals correctly with certainty an honest node’s vote is
at most
(
D
N
)k+1
.
Proof: The claim is followed by Theorem 2.
We plot the bound of Pce as a function f(γi, i) =
(
D
N
)i+1
in Fig. 3a for k = 3, N = 100 and D = 20. We see that Pce
increases with the increase of γi and the decrease of i. Thus,
we get the maximum privacy when all nodes generate 2k + 1
shares, and the minimum privacy when all nodes generate only
one share.
If the poll outcome is N (resp. −N ), it infers all nodes vote
for “+1” (resp. “−1”) and they all are disclosed. Moreover,
w.l.o.g, assume dishonest nodes always vote for “−1”, thus, if
the result is N−2D (resp.−N ) then it implies all honest nodes
vote for “+1” (resp. “−1”). Without considering these cases,
i.e., all honest nodes do not vote for the same option, Theorem
3 shows us the maximum number of votes the dishonest
coalition could discover.
Theorem 3. If all honest nodes do not vote for the same
option, a coalition of D dishonest nodes can reveal at most
2D votes of honest nodes.
Proof: A consumer receives on average ∑ki=0 γi(2i +
1) shares, hence, the dishonest coalition collects at most
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Fig. 3: Probability to disclose a node vote.
D
∑k
i=0 γi(2i + 1) shares. Moreover, a vote v of one node
voting with 2i+1 shares is revealed if and only if the coalition
obtains i + 1 identical shares of value v. Thus it recovers at
most ⌊D.
∑k
i=0 γi(2i+1)∑
k
i=0 γi(i+1)
⌋ ≤ 2D votes.
Vote disclosing without certainty. This part examines the case
that the dishonest nodes collude to reveal an honest node’s vote
without sureness. The coalition decides a node’s vote based on
the received shares in the sense they can decide the vote after
getting some shares or after getting all shares from that node.
Thus, they choose one of the following two strategies: (a) Upon
receipt of ρ + 1 identical shares (for some 0 ≤ ρ ≤ k) from
a given node, they will be considered as its vote; (b) After
receiving all shares from a given node, the most represented
value of the received shares will be considered as its vote. The
former strategy is used by the “greedy” dishonest users who
want to reveal rapidly the honest user’s vote (even if they have
just received one share). The latter one is used by the “non-
greedy” dishonest users who are patient and wait for receiving
all node’s shares before trying to disclose the vote. We present
the probabilities that a coalition of dishonest nodes discloses
an honest node’s vote for these situations in Theorems 4 and
5. Recall that each node does not know the number of shares
generated by other ones and ∆G is a network diameter.
Theorem 4 (Greedy vote disclosure). Assume a coalition
of D dishonest nodes agrees on the following rule “upon
receipt of ρ + 1 identical shares (0 ≤ ρ ≤ k) from a
given node, they will be considered as the node’s vote”. The
probability this coalition reveals correctly a node’s vote is
Pgr(ρ) =
∑k
i=ρ γi ·
(
D
ρ+1
)∑ρ
j=0
(
D−ρ−1
j
)
/
(
N
j+ρ+1
)
and is
bounded by
∑k
i=ρ γi
N+1
N−D+ρ+2 (
D
N−D+ρ+1 )
ρ+1
.
Proof: The dishonest nodes succeed to discover a
node’s vote v if that node has sent 2i + 1 ≥ 2ρ + 1
shares in which ρ + 1 identical ones representing v and
up to ρ shares of value −v were received by the dishonest
consumers. In contrast, the coalition’s decision is failed
if the node has sent more than 2ρ + 1 messages (i.e., at
least 2ρ + 3 messages) but the dishonest nodes obtained
only ρ + 1 messages of value −v and up to ρ messages
of value v. The probability a coalition of D dishonest
nodes discloses correctly a vote v is: Pgr(ρ) =
∑k
i=ρ γip(i)
where p(i) =
(
D
ρ+1
)∑ρ
j=0
(
D−ρ−1
j
)
/
(
N
j+ρ+1
)
. Using this
identity: 1/
(
n
j
)
= (n + 1)
∫ 1
0 t
j(1 − t)n−jdt for some
positive n and j, then p(i) is rewritten as follows: p(i) =
(N + 1)
(
D
ρ+1
)∑ρ
j=0
(
D−ρ−1
j
) ∫ 1
0
tj+ρ+1(1− t)N−j−ρ−1dt ≤
(N+1)
(
D
ρ+1
) ∫ 1
0 (1−t)N−ρ−1tρ+1
[∑D−ρ−1
j=0
(
D−ρ−1
j
) (
t
1−t
)j]
dt =
N+1
N−D+ρ+2
(
D
ρ+1
)
/
(
N−D+ρ+1
ρ+1
) ≤ N+1N−D+ρ+2
(
D
N−D+ρ+1
)ρ+1
.
This leads the desired result.
In Theorem 4, a vote v of the honest node is discovered if
that node has sent 2i+1 ≥ 2ρ+1 shares in which ρ+1 identical
ones representing v and up to ρ shares of value −v were
received by the dishonest consumers. Moreover, by Theorem
4, value Pgr increases when γi decreases (and i increases) and
D increases. For example, with N = 100, k = 1 (i.e., each
node votes with one share or 2k + 1 = 3 shares), ρ = 0, we
plot the probability Pgr as a function of D and γk in Fig. 3b.
As expected, the vote privacy decreases (i.e., Pgr increases)
when γk decreases and D increases.
Theorem 5 (Non-greedy vote disclosure). Assume a coalition
of D dishonest nodes agrees on the following rule “the
most represented value of the received shares from a given
node will be considered as the node’s vote”. The probabil-
ity this coalition reveals correctly a node’s vote is Pun =∑k
i=0 γi ·
∑i+1
j=1
∑j−1
t=0
(
D
j
)(
D−j
t
)
/
(
N
j+t
)
and is bounded by(
D
N /(1− 2DN )
)[
1−∑ki=0 γi(2DN )2i+1].
Proof: The dishonest nodes reveal successfully a vote v
of a node voting with 2i + 1 shares if they receive j shares
of value v and t shares of value −v such that i + 1 ≥
j > t ≥ 0. This event occurs with probability p(i) =∑i+1
j=1
∑j−1
t=0
(
D
j
)(
D−j
t
)
/
(
N
j+t
)
. We have:
(
D
j
)(
D−j
t
)
/
(
N
j+t
) ≤(
D
N
)j+t (j+t
j
)
. We denote a = D/N and find the up-
per bound of
∑i+1
j=1
∑j−1
t=0 a
t+j
(
j+t
j
)
. Rewrite that expres-
sion as
∑2i+1
r=1 a
r
∑
i<j∧i+j=r
(
r
i
) ≤ ∑2i+1r=1 ar 12 ∑ri=0 (ri) =
1
2
∑2i+1
r=1 (2a)
r = a1−2a
(
1 − (2a)2i+1). Since a node sends
2i + 1 shares with probability γi, and we consider all pos-
sibilities of value i, this gives us the desired result Pun =∑k
i=0 γip(i) ≤ a1−2a [1−
∑k
i=0 γi(2a)
2i+1].
By Theorem 5, the quantity Pun increases when both
values γi and D increase (and also i increases). For N = 100
and k = 1, Fig. 3c shows the impact of D and γk on Pun.
According to this result, as expected, the vote privacy decreases
(i.e., Pun increases) when both D and γk increase.
Combining vote disclosure with and without certainty.
The dishonest nodes may try to reveal a node’s vote either
in certainty or uncertainty. Assume they respect the vote
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disclosure rule with and without certainty. From the viewpoint
of dishonest nodes, they always want their vote detection to
be as certain as possible, i.e., they prefer a node’s vote being
revealed with certainty to other cases. Hence their strategy is as
follows: they first try to disclose a vote of node with sureness.
If they do not succeed, for instance, because of lacking of
messages, they will consider the way to detect that vote without
certainty. It implies the probability a vote is disclosed in this
case is Pcom = max{Pce, Pgr, Pun}.
Accuracy. In this section, we evaluate the maximum and
average impact on accuracy caused by the dishonest coalition
when we deploy EPol on the graphs of G2. A dishonest node
may affect the poll outcome with the following misbehaviors:
(i) Since a node can only generate and send shares to
its consumers it is assigned (otherwise the shares are
dropped) and there are at most 2k + 1 consumers to be
assigned, it must send at most 2k+1 shares in which at
most k + 1 ones are identical. Hence a dishonest node
may give the misbehavior by sending more than k + 1
(but not greater than 2k + 1) identical shares.
(ii) It inverts each receiving “+1”-share into a “−1”-share to
decrease the collected data.
(iii) It modifies the collected data of other honest node or
sends a forged message in the broadcasting phase.
Verification procedures: in the first attack, the worst case is
when the dishonest node sends all 2k + 1 shares of value
“−1”. In the attack (ii), a node receives at most 2k+1 shares
(since at most 2k + 1 producers are assigned) and thus, the
computing collected data must be inside the range [−(2k +
1), 2k + 1]. The misbehaviors (i) and (ii) cannot be detected
without inspecting the content of the shares themselves, but
the misbehavior (iii) is detected with certainty if the dishonest
nodes transmit or corrupt the collected data outside the range
[−(2k + 1), 2k + 1]. Noted that we do not consider the Sybil
attacks, hence, in case (iii) a dishonest node cannot create a
forged message containing identity of other node. Moreover,
this activity does not affect the final result since a node receives
directly a message from source s (if it is a neighbor of s) or
gets a majority of receiving messages (⌈(m+1)/2⌉) containing
the correct data of s. We show the impact of these misbehaviors
on accuracy in Theorems 6 and 7.
Theorem 6 (Maximum impact). Each dishonest node may
affect the final result up to 6k + 4.
Proof: In cases (i) and (ii) of the dishonest misbehaviors,
the worst case of these misbehaviors occurs when the dishonest
node sends 2k + 1 shares of value “−1” and inverts all
the receiving “+1”-shares into “−1”-shares before computing
the collected data. As a node is allowed to send only a set
of shares that can regenerate to the vote of value “−1” or
“+1”, the first and the second attacks respectively affect up to
2k+1−(−1) = 2k+2 (if a node votes for “+1” but it generates
2k+1 shares of value “−1”) and (2k+1)−(−2k−1) = 4k+2
(if it gets 2k+ 1 shares of value “+1” but inverts all into the
shares of value “−1”). In the misbehavior (iii), a dishonest
node only modifies the collected data of other honest node s
such that the data is in the range [−2k−1, 2k+1], otherwise its
misbehavior will be detected. However this activity does not
affect the final result since one node receives a direct message
from s (if it is a neighbor of s) or receives m forwarding
messages from neighbors in which at most ⌊(m − 1)/2⌋
messages are corrupted, and majority messages (⌈(m+1)/2⌉)
contain correct data, thus an honest node always obtains the
correct collected data of s. Therefore, the maximum impact
from one dishonest node is 2k + 2 + 4k + 2 = 6k + 4.
Theorem 7 (Average impact). Let α be the proportion of nodes
voting for “+1”. The average impact from a dishonest node
is Iavg =
[∑k
i=0 γi(2i+ 1)
][
1 + 2
∑k
i=0 γi
i+α
2i+1
]
+ 1.
Proof: Each node generates i + 1 shares of its tendency,
and i opposite shares, thus, the consumers receive a “+1”-
share with probability
∑k
i=0 γi[α
i+1
2i+1 + (1 − α) i2i+1 ] =∑k
i=0 γi
i+α
2i+1 . In addition, as the average number of re-
ceiving shares is
∑k
i=0 γi(2i + 1), the average number of
“+1”-shares is
[∑k
i=0 γi(2i + 1)
][∑k
i=0 γi
i+α
2i+1
]
. By alter-
ing any receiving “+1”-share into “−1”-share this impacts
(1−(−1))[∑ki=0 γi(2i+1)][∑ki=0 γi i+α2i+1 ] = 2[∑ki=0 γi(2i+
1)
][∑k
i=0 γi
i+α
2i+1
]
. Moreover, a dishonest node sends on av-
erage
∑k
i=0 γi(2i+ 1) shares of value “−1” which affects by
1 +
∑k
i=0 γi(2i + 1). Consequently, the total average impact
from a dishonest node is Iavg =
[∑k
i=0 γi(2i + 1)
][
1 +
2
∑k
i=0 γi
i+α
2i+1
]
+ 1.
The quantity Iavg is minimized when all nodes generate
the same number of shares, e.g., 2i + 1, and thus Iavg =
2(2i+α+1). In the worst case, a dishonest node sends 2k+1
shares, the minimized average impact is Iavg = 2(2k+α+1).
Corollary 2. The expected biased result is in the range [(2α−
1)N − (6k+4)D; (2α− 1)N ]. More particularly, if all nodes
send 2k + 1 shares, then the expected biased result is (2α −
1)N − (4k + 2α+ 2)D.
Proof: The expected outcome is αN.1+(1−α)N.(−1) =
(2α− 1)N . By Theorem 6, the maximum impact of dishonest
nodes is (6k + 4)D, hence, the biased result must be in the
range [(2α− 1)N − (6k + 4)D; (2α− 1)N ]. In addition, by
Theorem 7, if all nodes send 2k+ 1 shares then total average
impact is (4k + 2α+ 2)D, and this yields the proof.
By Theorems 2–7 and Corollaries 1–2, for a fixed param-
eter k, the number of users voting with a high number of
shares (e.g., 2k + 1 shares) affects the privacy and accuracy.
More concretely, if we care about vote privacy, we should
augment the number of nodes generating 2k + 1 shares since
the probability to disclose a node’s vote with certainty (Pce)
and with greedy uncertainty (Pgr) will decrease. But this rises
up the probability Pun of non-greedy vote disclosure and the
impact on the final outcome. In contrast, if we take care of the
accuracy of the final result, we should decrease the number
of nodes voting with 2k + 1 shares since that reduces the
impact on the final outcome. It also decreases Pun. However
this increases the values Pce and Pgr.
Security. In this part, we compute the maximum number of
dishonest nodes that EPol can tolerate.
Lemma 1. A node decides correctly the collected data of an
honest source s if it connects directly to s or there are at most
(m − 1)/2 dishonest neighbors preceding it (in the ordering
w.r.t. source s).
Proof: It is a trivial case when a node connects directly to
source s. We only consider the case where a node n /∈ Γ(s).
Since a node gets randomly m messages among βn(s) ones,
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and its decision is based on the majority appearance of a value,
it is necessary that less than m/2 messages are corrupted. This
infers the desired result.
Theorem 8 (Tolerance to dishonest nodes). The maximum
number of dishonest nodes that EPol can tolerate is m−12 ∆G.
Proof: We denote Γ1n = Γ(n), and define recursively the
set of friends at distance j of n, where j > 1 by Γjn = {u |
δ(u, n) = j} = {u | u ∈ Γv ∧ v ∈ Γj−1n ∧ u /∈
⋃
k<j Γ
k
n}.
We define by ϕn(s) the set of n’s neighbors preceding n
in the ordering w.r.t. source s. We have |ϕn(s)| = βn(s).
Let dist(u, v) denote the distance, i.e., the length of the
shortest path, between nodes u and v. By Lemma 1, node n
decides correctly about the collected data of honest source s if
n ∈ Γ(s) or |ϕn(s)∩D| ≤ (m− 1)/2. To find out the highest
number of dishonest nodes in the system we only consider
the case n /∈ Γ(s). In general, node u ∈ ϕn(s) may be at any
distance from s (even dist(u, s) ≥ dist(n, s)). It means n may
receive a corrupted data from a dishonest node at any distance
from s. Since n receives at most (m−1)/2 corrupted messages,
the necessary condition to guarantee n decides correctly s’s
collected data is there are at most (m − 1)/2 dishonest
friends of s at distance i, i.e., |Γis ∩ D| ≤ (m − 1)/2 where
1 ≤ i ≤ Rad(s,G) and Rad(s,G) = maxu∈V {dist(s, u)}.
This infers the maximum number of dishonest nodes such
that each node receives correct collected data of source s is
D(s) =
∑Rad(s,G)
i=1 |Γis∩D| ≤ m−12 Rad(s,G). Considering all
source nodes in the network, we have D ≤ maxs∈V {D(s)} =
m−1
2 ∆G.
Notice that our protocol can tolerate more than
√
N
dishonest nodes for a ring-based structure introduced in [1], [2]
(unlike these works tolerate less than √N dishonest nodes).
Indeed, as this structure has the diameter ∆G =
√
N , and with
parameter m ≥ 3, the upper bound of D is not less than √N .
Corollary 3. If D ≤ m−12 ∆G then a node decides wrongly
the collected data of some other node with the probability
converging to 0 exponentially fast in N (and ∆G).
Proof: We define by ϕn(s) the set of n’s neighbors
preceding n in the ordering w.r.t. source s. By Lemma 1,
if |ϕn(s) ∩ D| ≥ m/2 then a node n may decide wrongly
the collected data of source s (or could not make decision).
We inspire the idea from [2] to compute the probability this
event occurs by using standard Hoeffding bounds for sampling
from a finite population without replacement (with the notice
that ∆G ≤ N − 1): ps = Pr
[
|ϕn(s) ∩ D| ≥ m/2
]
=
Pr
[
|ϕn(s)∩D|− D∆G ≥ 1∆G (m2 ∆G−D)
]
≤ exp( −2∆G (m2 ∆G−
D)2) ≤ exp( −2N−1 (m2 ∆G − D)2). As D < m2 ∆G, the right-
hand function tends to 0 exponentially fast in N (and ∆G).
It implies the probability for a node decides wrongly the
collected data of some source (or could not make decision)
is Pc = Pr
[⋃
s∈V {|ϕn(s) ∩ D| ≥ m/2}
]
≤ ∑s∈V ps ≤
N exp( −2N−1(
m
2 ∆G −D)2). The right-hand function tends to
0 exponentially fast in N .
EPol vs. graphs. We examine the necessary and sufficient
condition for our protocol to be deployed safely and securely
in the following Theorem.
Theorem 9. The properties of G1 and G2 are respectively
the necessary and sufficient condition for EPol to be deployed
safely and correctly in the system without and with the pres-
ence of dishonest nodes.
Proof: We here just show this theorem with graphs of
G2. For graphs of G1, the proof is easily considered as its
consequences. The sufficient condition (⇐) is proved by
Theorems 1–8. We only need to clarify the necessary condition
(⇒). Assume we have a general graph G. We approach the
proof by sketching step by step the requirements G should
obtain so that all properties of protocol are guaranteed. In
the sharing phase, node n sends (or receives) at most 2k + 1
messages, i.e., |Sn| = |Rn| ≤ 2k + 1. In addition, it has to
send an odd number of messages, thus, |Sn| = 2i + 1 where
0 ≤ i ≤ k. As |Sn| and |Rn| might not be disjoint, then
dn ≥ 2k + 1. Therefore, to apply protocol correctly, G must
have the property Pg1 . In addition, in the broadcasting phase
of EPol, a node decides a data of some source s if it connects
directly to s, or to at least m nodes which have preceding
orders. This infers the graph must satisfy the m-broadcasting
condition. Finally, the Lemma 1 shows the necessary property
Pg3 that a graph must satisfy to deploy EPol. Accordingly, the
graph G is a member of family G2 of graphs.
V. CRASH AND MESSAGE LOSS ANALYSIS
Nodes communicate by UDP which may suffer message
loss on the communication channels. In addition, nodes may
be unreliable, causing expected messages to be lost due to
sender crashes. Assuming the presence of node crashes and
message losses in the system, this part analyzes the effect of
these factors on accuracy and termination of the protocol. Here
we assume that the system contains no dishonest nodes.
Impact on termination. Suppose a node is crashed with
probability r (and it is never recovered from a crash), a
message is lost (throughout transmitting) with probability l,
a node fails to send shares to its consumers with probability
q = r + (1− r)l. A node n fails to decide a collected data of
source s since:
1. n = s: s fails to compute its collected data cs.
2. n ∈ Γ(s): n does not receive a broadcast message from
s.
3. n /∈ Γ(s): more than βn(s)−m (preceding) neighbors fail
to forward the collected data as they either: (i) crashed,
or (ii) have themselves not decided on the collected data,
or (iii) have forwarded messages but they are lost.
We define by eni and zni respectively the probability
for a node n at distance i from source s to fail to for-
ward and fail to decide a collected data of s. We have
eni = r + (1 − r)[zni + (1 − zni)l], where zn0 = zs =∑|Rs|−1
j=0
(
|Rs|
j
)
(1 − q)jq|Rs|−j , zn1 = en0 , and zni =∑m−1
j=0
[(
βn(s)
j
)∏j
t=1(1 − entlt )
∏βn(s)
p=j+1 enplp
]
where i ≥ 2,
{n1, n2, . . . , nβn(s)} and {l1, l2, . . . , lβn(s)} are respectively
the sets of preceding friends of n (w.r.t. s) and their corre-
sponding distances to s. Notice that lj could be greater than i
for j = 1, 2, ...βn(s). A node does not decide on the outcome
if it has not decided on at least one collected data of some
source, that is zn∆G .
Impact on accuracy. A node crash affects the final result when
that node has some unique information and they have not yet
been replicated, typically the shares of votes. It crashes (i)
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while sending its shares to consumers, or (ii) after summing
up shares from producers. The former case affects the final
outcome up to k + 1 (if it crashes after sending k shares of
−v). The latter case affects up to 2k + 1. Hence, the impact
of such a crash on final result is at most 3k + 2.
VI. RELATED WORK
Several recent works related to secret sharing and dis-
tributed polling have been proposed. We introduce some works
which are not based on any overlay structure and heavy
computation. Secret sharing schemes [19], [20] may be used
for polling with respect to addition. However, as they do not
give the protection for the initial shares, the outcome is likely
impacted with the presence of dishonest nodes. Verifiable
Secret Sharing Scheme (VSS) and Multi-party Computation
protocol (MPC) in [21], [22] privately compute the node’s
shares and give output with small error if a majority of nodes is
honest. Nonetheless, without the condition of the initial input,
a dishonest node can share arbitrary data, and bias the output.
These protocols also use cryptography. This drawback is also
applied for other studies based on MPC such as [23], [24],
[25], [26] even the time and communication complexity are
improved. Authors of [27] proposed AMPC which provides
users anonymity without using cryptography, but this work
used the notion of group. Based on AMPC and enhanced check
vectors, E-voting protocol [7] is the information-theoretically
secure protocol. But it defines different roles for users and thus,
is different from our direction. The distributed ranking schemes
are also related to our concern. However, they try to design
accurate grading mechanism rather than providing efficient
polling schemes [28], [29] and not address to privacy [30]. In
[10], the m-propagating condition enables the use of minimal
shares for the secret. But, in our work, it is used to create a
majority for deciding the correct value during the broadcasting
phase of our protocol. The protocol in [31] and AG-S3 [32]
can be used for polling in a scalable and secure way, but they
either use (i) a ring-based overlay, or (ii) cryptography.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper presented EPol, a distributed polling protocol
for a general family of social graphs, while preserving vote
privacy and limit the impact on accuracy of the polling
outcome. Unlike other work, our protocol is deployed in a
more general family of graphs, and we obtained some similar
and better results. In addition, we introduced some uncertain
vote disclosure rules for dishonest nodes, and presented the
probabilities of vote detection in these cases. We also analyzed
the effect of message losses and nodes crashes on accuracy and
termination. Despite the use of richer social graph structures,
the communication and spatial complexities of EPol are close
to be linear. In future work, we plan to implement our
suggested protocol in some decentralized social networks like
Diaspora and Tent.
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APPENDIX
A. Examples of the networks
The algorithm EPol requires the graphs in a family sat-
isfying the m-broadcasting property. Here we illustrate some
particular graphs of this family. The examples of these graphs
for m = 3 are also depicted in Fig.4 and they can be
generalized to any value m.
(a) Layered networks. Each layer contains at least m nodes,
and each node links to all other nodes in neighboring layer.
The number of nodes in each layer could be different.
For each source node, an (increased) ordering satisfying
the m-broadcasting-source property w.r.t. this source is the
ordering of the nodes with respect to the distance from the
source.
(b) Networks with a backbone. The graph includes a back-
bone which is densely connected graph, and other nodes
outside the backbone which connect directly to at least
m nodes in the backbone. An ordering satisfying the
m-broadcasting-source property w.r.t. one source is the
ordering under the backbone subgraph, followed by all
remaining nodes not in the backbone.
(c) One-dimensional geometric networks. All nodes are
arranged along a line, and there is a connection between
two nodes if their distance is smaller than a fixed threshold.
Each node has at least m connections. An ordering of
nodes w.r.t. one source is the order of their euclidean
distance from the source.
(d) Cluster-ring-based graph [5], [4], [1], [2]. The N nodes
are clustered into r =
√
N ordered groups, from g0 to
gr−1. Each group is a clique. A node n in group gi also
links to a fixed-size set Sn of nodes in the next group
(Sn ⊂ gi+1 mod r), and a fixed-size set Rn of nodes in
the previous group where |Sn| = |Rn| = 2k+1. Thus, all
groups virtually form a ring with g0 being the successor of
gr−1. In fact, this structure is a particular case of layered
networks presented above in which each layer is a clique
of size
√
N , and all layers virtually form a ring. Hence
for each source node, an (increased) ordering satisfying
the m-broadcasting-source property w.r.t. a source is the
ordering of the nodes with respect to the distance from the
source. It is also ordered based on the distance from the
source and the direction of sending messages, e.g., from
group gi to gi+1 mod r.
(e) Circle-based networks. Consider a graph G0 ∈ G2 of size
N > 2k+ 1 where each node n has the set of consumers
Sn which is the output of the function:
f : A→ 2A
n 7→ {(n− 1) mod N, (n+ 1) mod N, ...(n+ 2k) mod N}
where A = {0, 1, 2 . . . , (N − 1)}. The set of producers
is Rn = {(n + 1) mod N, (n − 1) mod N, (n − 2) mod
N, . . . , (n−2k) mod N} of size 2k+1. Figure 4e depicts
an example of this graph with N = 6 and k = 1 in which
the arrows express the direction of sending messages. For
each source node, an (increased) ordering satisfying the
m-broadcasting-source property w.r.t. this source is the
ordering of the nodes with respect to the distance from
the source.
(a) Layered network (b) Backbone network
(c) One-dimensional geometric network
gi
u
gi−1
gi+1
(d) Cluster-ring-based network (e) Circle-based network
Fig. 4: Examples of networks satisfying the 3-broadcasting property.
All protocols in [6], [5], [4], [1], [2] cannot be deployed
in this graph since the condition Sn ∩Rn = ∅ (proposed
in these works) is not satisfied for every node n.
B. Graph construction
We present briefly an algorithm for constructing an m-
broadcasting graph from an arbitrary graph of size N where
the set of nodes V = {1, 2, ..., N} as follows:
1. Choose any ordering of the N nodes.
2. For i = 1 to m: If node i does not have an edge
from the source, then insert an edge from the source
to this node.
3. For i = m + 1 to n: Count the number of edges
linking to node i from nodes in the set {1, ..., i−1}.
If this count is less than m then add edges from an
arbitrary subset of nodes {1, ..., i − 1} to node m
such that the count reaches m.
The resulting graph will satisfy the m-broadcasting prop-
erty.
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